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Surviving iPhone challenges as the 1990s Microsoft

When Apple begins a new year of operations, a media story unfolds that Apple must dike its dependence on premium hardware, and especially the iPhone, to desperately crawl into Services for the remnants behind Netflix in the world of commodity units. But reality is actually much less dramatic for Apple, which has already proven an unusual ability to adapt to industry changes. Compare now its position with Microsoft twenty years ago.

Netscape once threatened to marginalize Windows in the same way Androids is being portrayed as a threat to iOS today

Microsoft Lessons in Subsequent and Failure

History is full of companies that either quickly corrected the course to accommodate changes in the market, or failed in errors because they did not adapt. In the mid-1990s, Microsoft's dominant Windows PC platform was challenged by Netscape, Java, and other technologies that would make the World Wide Web an open platform that offers a less restrictive, cheaper, decentralized alternative to Windows software.

Microsoft quickly and radically changed its direction in response to the threat of Netscape Navigator. It used its existing position with Windows and Server to establish Internet Explorer as the de facto browser, deriving much of the growing momentum behind Netscape and the open web, instead enriching its own Windows platform.

But a decade later, Microsoft was completely blindsided by Apple's iOS in phones and tablets. In addition, Microsoft's parallel efforts to push Google's search business to a great extent failed. Today, Microsoft enjoys more success in fighting Amazon for a piece of enterprise cloud pie.

What made Microsoft successful – or not dealing with various major transitions in technology – seems to be leadership at first glance. However, a key factor in determining the success level of navigating through a larger market transition was the quality of the technology it had available .

Netscape's goal in the 1990s was based on relatively simple web technology. Microsoft was able to acquire the same NCSA Mosaic browser code Netscape itself had jumped from making its own IE browser. It then bent its market muscle to tie IE to its existing Windows brand and platform in a way that was devastating to Netscape, a company that hadn't even figured out how to compete to make money from its business.

But a decade later, Microsoft had no way to buy a copy of iOS. As Apple continued to rapidly build its extremely profitable iPhone business, followed up with the 2010 same lucrative iPad, Microsoft stuck with older Windows code related to Intel processor technology that was not competitive in phones or tablets.

Attempts to build an "iOS killer" from scratch (including Windows Phone and Windows RT) took much longer than expected. Nobody could eventually get traction fast enough to track Apple's threat before iOS established itself as the commercial leader in corporate and consumer mobility.

  Windows RT

Microsoft could not buy iOS, so it burned over two years of writing Windows RT while iPad took over the tablet market

Similarly, Microsoft's efforts to build or buy search and surveillance technology for its competitors to Google Very profitable, ad-supported Internet web services never managed to replace "Googling" with "Bing", despite massive multibillion-dollar efforts by the company to reduce Google's position. The Windows and Mosaic technology that worked in the 1990s to keep the network tied to Windows PCs was not enough to keep Microsoft relevant to mobile devices or online search ads.

In cloud services, Microsoft's Azure is much better positioned to compete against Amazon and Google. This resulted in a competitive market for shooting services that is capable of supporting several successful companies. Investors have today given Microsoft a high value despite the fact that the company has lost the ball in mobile devices and searches.

But in no way does anyone seem to be concerned that Microsoft did "most of their money" that sold Windows licensing before it moved into applications and then servers and then cloud services.

Apple looks at Apple through the Microsoft lens

. Apple naysayers like to suggest that the company is uneasy because it relies on iPhone sales to earn most of its revenue. That's because smart phone sales generally don't grow fast anymore. It's also popular to say that the new markets Apple has built over the past decade, from tablets to wearables to home accessories to Services, are all "relatively nothing" compared to the company's $ 166.7 billion in annual iPhone revenue.

In reality, Apple's "other businesses", beyond the iPhone and Mac, currently make up another $ 73.4 billion. It's almost three times Apple's own Mac operations that generate another $ 25 billion annually.

Add Apple's most new, after-iPhone business before the iPhone Mac business, it has maintained – and even grown despite a 25 percent reduction in overall PC shipments over the past decade – And everything you get for Apple's non-iPhone business is significantly more than half of the iPhone format.

You can't say that Apple's non-iPhone revenue is "nothing" unless they also say the same about Microsoft's or Google's overall revenue! Apple's $ 100 billion in annual revenue outside of the iPhone is a gigantic operation, and the fact that such a huge business can be overshadowed by iPhone revenue, says more about the scope of iPhone demand than the "negligence" of everything else Apple does.

Apple's largest and fastest growing new segment is Services, now a $ 37.2 billion company annually that grows faster than any of the hardware sales. But despite the parallel success and the current weakness of the smartphone industry, Apple's iPhone revenues do not face anything like the collapse of Microsoft's Windows licensing over the past decade.

It has not stopped any analysts from imagining a fantasy of the iPhone which is an impressive business that melts under its own weight. Pundits also likes to point out the examples of Blackberry and Nokia, both of which were once around the world in making mobile phones until the demand for their products quickly retreated to oblivion. Perhaps the same can happen to Apple!

But there is really backward logic for several reasons. First, all marginally successful smartphone makers make most of their revenue from smartphones. Samsung's IM Mobile division generates almost zero profits outside of its sales of smartphones, despite the group's attempt to sell a wider range of various other tablets, PCs and portable hardware than Apple. Huawei, Lenovo and BBK's Oppo, Vivo, and OnePlus brands obviously earn an overwhelming majority of the profits from phone sales because there are simply no equivalent amounts of money to be made in either tablets or PCs or other hardware.

In fact, the only companies that do not get the most out of the phone hardware profits are the smartphone errors. If Amazon, Microsoft, Motorola, Nokia or Google had been successful in challenging Apple's iPhones, they would now earn most of the money from phone hardware, just because smartphones are a product that has been in high demand at support-capable prices profit for many years now. Apple has simply capitalized on that demand in a way that has been dramatically more successful than any other product category in the history of personal computing.

  Amazon Fire Phone

If Fire Phone hadn't flopped, would investors be angry most of Amazon's profits came from a smartphone?

Imagine if Jeff Bezos Fire Phone hadn't been the flop. Will analysts tell us it was a big problem that all of Amazon's profits now come from selling a successful new hardware product? It doesn't look like it. Although the fire phone's rescued remains, which Amazon has used to operate its Alexa service and loss-making Echo and Kindle Fire hardware, have been breathlessly praised despite achieving almost nothing for the company commercially or strategically, delivering a fat zero in profit, directly or through increased online sales.

Imagine if Microsoft's Windows Phone had taken off, and the world had been linked to corporate Windows, instead of being cracked open for consumer choice of BYOD policies. Would anyone be worried that Microsoft was now making so much of the revenue and profits from smartphones, or that the acquisition of Nokia had worked so well? No. The world of punditry is in love with Microsoft and Amazon now each taking in around $ 20-25 billion annually from shooting services. If they earned Apple's $ 166.7 billion in iPhone revenue, AWS and Azure will be considered worthless because each is "just" about the size of Apple's Mac revenue?

  Microsoft Nokia acquisition

Pundits celebrated Microsoft's $ 7.2 billion acquisition of Nokia, but it ended in disaster

Imagine if Motorola had been successful and had made Google's $ 12.5 billion acquisition to a presciently strategic maneuver In stealing the smartphone business from Apple as Android fans had hoped it would several years ago. Would anyone be sorry that Google earned far more from its global phone than the $ 100 billion it currently brings from most of their advertising revenue? They didn't want to. And I state that Wall Street Journal shouldn't write articles on how Google should just shut down the advertising and search industry because they are "so small in comparison."

In 2015, Christopher Mims stated that Apple should "kill off Mac", a company that generates $ 25.5 billion in annual revenue.

Do not fear for the company that can jump.

The arrogant advice and concerns concern that various experts and analysts say Apple continues to come despite a solid track record of successful navigation of new techno transitions. It seems beyond their understanding that Apple not only experiences waves of luck, each of which manages to delay its imminent death by a few months.

The reality is that Apple once rely on Macs to get the bulk of its revenue, but when the demand for Mac seemed to stop growing, it introduced the iPod. Shortly after, most of the income came from personal audio devices. Finally, it turned out that they would no longer grow. That's when the company introduced the iPhone. No one in the Pundit country predicted the iPod and no one saw any changes in the world to the iPhone until they became undeniable afterwards.

Given that Apple has been the only consumer electronics industry company to transfer from a primary to successful and successful revenue source to the next, it would not seem likely that if there is something to replace the iPhone, Apple would probably be the one to be do it?

Over the last few years there have been two fronts in the war on the iPhone: one is the ambitious replacement of smartphones with a futuristic AR / VR laptop according to Google Glass or Microsoft Hololens or an advanced smartwatch wearable, Others is a more pedestrian replacement of Apple's aging iPhone with a brand new rival phone design with a full-face display with minimal wrapping, characterized by Andy Rubin's essential phone. But both iPhone attack wings jumped out of resources before they could take the flight.

When they fell from the sky, Apple launched its own vision for the future: Face ID powered iPhone X with a forward-facing depth camera set to make AR a selfie-focused smartphone feature, rather than an early smartphone replacement in goggles. Apple had also successfully developed and distributed Apple Watch as the only successful watch product and moved on to AirPods before any other watchmaker or alternative wear could get any move.

  iPhone X

iPhone X was a radical, mass market jump [19659031] So Apple has stepped all possible iPhone replacements from businesses large and small, while continuing to make and radically modernize its own iPhone. At the same time, Apple Watch and AirPods added important new businesses that anchor rather than cannibalizing their iPhone business. Why was Apple able to win all the fighting in the war on the iPhone? It had to do with technology.

Leaping with what you know

In 2007, Steve Jobs announced that Apple Computer would rename only Apple, Inc. in recognition of the fact that it was now building more than just conventional personal computers. It happened just before the iPod's point of sale, right at the introduction of the iPhone. But Apple didn't stop building Macs, and iPods didn't really go away. instead, the music player met a software feature of iOS devices.

IOS devices were in themselves also a mobile optimized version of Apple's Macs. Apple's ability to capture its existing primary product and technology portfolio and optimize it to serve a wider, broader market has consistently been the key to survival and dramatic growth.

Apple's ability and ability to refashion its desktop Mac platform to drive a new set of iOS mobile devices aimed at non-technical users was not a fly. The fact that it took the company to sell a few million Macs annually to mass production of more than a quarter billion computing units annually is also not an error or an unmanageable difficulty, although most of these devices are currently labeled as "iPhones."

Peak iPhone is no longer an end to Apple than the apparent range of Peak Mac sales in 2001, or the Peak iPod event in 2008. The iPhone base will continue to grow, previous products will continue to expand or multiply new and completely new product categories will develop. We have several reasons to believe that Apple will continue to provide home purchases, than we support the idea that Apple's failed competitors will whip up some surprises that will make a significant number of Apple's loyal customers into devoted buyers of a Pixel, Surface, Essential, MiPhone, Galaxy or OnePlus.

Apple's adept ability to adapt its existing technology is what makes it possible to continue winning this war on iPhone battles. So why do so many analysts and pounds put so much blind faith into companies that have repeatedly failed to beat Apple, and have such a cynical doubt in Apple? They have largely said that Apple was a mistake away from failure for a solid twenty years now. It is a long time to repeat the same mistake proposal.

Apple's unique leap game

Apple's ability to jump to new product categories is particularly noteworthy when considering that other companies could not quite do these leaps. Various PC decision makers, including the PC platform giant Microsoft, were unable to relocate their existing PC technology portfolio to successful mobile devices despite many years of efforts, far greater initial resources to work with compared to Apple in 2006, and broad industrial participation. Pocket PC, UMPC tablets, Tablet PC, Windows Mobile, Slate PC, Zune, Windows Phone and Windows RT were all big mistakes.

The open source community, which is associated with such titans as Intel, Nokia and Samsung, has also failed to take desktop Linux into the mobile world. LiMo, Maemo, Moblin, MeeGo, Firefox OS, Seilfisk, Tizen, KaiOS and Ubuntu Touch were all well-meaning efforts that have really gone nowhere in either personal or corporate mobile devices.

Google's Android was not based on an existing desktop platform, but rather on Sun's mobile Java ME middleware. Android uses the Linux kernel just as Tivo did. But the Android application platform is not Linux; it is Dalvik byte code. And vice versa, Google has been unable to incorporate its Android / DEX model into new computing form factors, including tablets, media devices, game consoles, or wear, despite a decade of intense but ultimately unsuccessful effort.

Apple's mature Mac development framework and scalable operating system gave the company the ability to quickly innovate its way into a smartphone market that was thought to be largely impossible to enter due to the competing threats of so many large, rooted rivals. On the other hand, Android only replaced licensed platforms such as Symbian, Java ME and Windows Mobile with software that was free.

Those companies that could not compete with the iPhone using the previous platforms (including Blackberry and Nokia) are not harbingers of Apple's forthcoming fate. Instead, they shun the current set of companies using the Android platform, which is only "good enough" for today's smartphones, but lacks the capacity to support what's next. The iOS, on the other hand, has already successfully created new businesses in tablets, home appliances and durable, even though the original Mac still generates leading profits in the conventional PC room.

Android still delivers on many devices, just as Java was once sent on many Nokia and Blackberry devices. But in both cases, the underlying technology does not create successful new products that Apple has created more new product categories from iPad to Apple Watch to AirPods.

  iPad Pro 2018

Apple lept from Mac to iPhone, when brought its iOS experience to the iPad, has great leap no other platform has succeeded

Mobile Mac

The fact that Apple called its product iPhone and Not "Mac Mobile" created an arbitrary limit in many people's minds that two were unrelated. But in reality, the iPhone was as closely related to the Mac as a mobile device and a desktop PC could be, albeit using a new set of interface guidelines, policies, and design changes that were imposed to make it successful as a mass market mobile device.

By way of comparison, Microsoft's own "Windows Mobile" was radically different from the desktop Windows for almost all technical considerations, except for transferring the same old PC desktop, the non-security software market for users or developers, and its other legacy ties to 1990 number PC world that held it back.

So from the 21st century to the last presence of the 2010s, Apple has been able to exert its fast and innovative ability to take its existing technology and create new computing forms that retain its influence over the most commercially successful. and strategically important markets – not through monopoll licensing, but by creating the products that most people want to pay a premium for. The winning strategy of the past also seems to be the best for the future.

Consider Apple's future in PCs and iPhones, detailed tomorrow in the next two segments of this series.

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